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INTRODUCTION
On March 30, 1998, the United States Supreme Court heard oral
arguments in Bragdon v. Abbott,1 the Supreme Court’s first case in
which Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (“AIDS”) and Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (“HIV”)2 were issues before the Court. On
April 13, 1998, a judge in the Western District of Wisconsin decided a
motion for summary judgment in United States v. Happy Time Day Care
Center3 that demonstrated a loophole in the Supreme Court’s thenunannounced decision in Bragdon.4 The issue before both courts was
1. 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2213 (1998) (holding that asymptomatic HIV infection is a
disability for the purposes of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101 (1994)).
2. HIV is the virus that causes AIDS. See generally F. Barre-Sinoussi et al., Isolation
of a T-Lymphotropic Retrovirus from a Patient at Risk for Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS), 220 SCIENCE 868 (1983) (concluding that HIV causes AIDS); Robert
C. Gallo et al., Frequent Detection and Isolation of Cytopathic Retroviruses (HTLV-III) from
Patients with AIDS and at Risk for AIDS, 224 SCIENCE 500 (1984) (observing a causative
link between HLTV-III virus and AIDS); Jay A. Levy et al., Isolation of Lymphocytopathic
Retroviruses from San Francisco Patients with AIDS, 225 SCIENCE 840 (1984) (noting
strong suggestions that two retroviruses may cause AIDS).
The Supreme Court’s decision in Bragdon provides an excellent background on
the science of HIV disease. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2204. Justice Kennedy carefully
and thoughtfully describes the progression from exposure to the virus to the
condition known as AIDS, writing:
A person is regarded as having AIDS when his or her CD4+ count [a kind of
white blood cell, also known as T cells] drops below 200 cells/mm3 of blood
or when CD4+ cells comprise less than 14% of his or her total lymphocytes.
During this stage, the clinical conditions most often associated with HIV,
such as pneumocystis carninii pneumonia, Kaposi’s sarcoma, and nonHodgkins lymphoma, tend to appear. In addition, the general systemic
disorders present during all stages of the disease, such as fever, weight loss,
fatigue, lesions, nausea, and diarrhea, tend to worsen. In most cases, once
the patient’s CD4+ count drops below 10 cells/mm3, death soon follows.
Id. (citations omitted).
Former Surgeon General C. Everett Koop, in 1988, observed that it is
“inappropriate to think of [HIV disease] as composed of discrete conditions such as
ARC or ‘full blown’ AIDS. HIV infection is the starting point of a single disease
which progresses through a variable range of stages.” Letter from C. Everett Koop,
Surgeon General, to Douglas W. Kmiec, Acting Assistant Attorney General (July 29,
1988), reprinted in Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings on S. 933 Before the
Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 101st
Cong. 367-68 (1989). Accordingly, this Comment will not draw arbitrary distinctions
among the various phases of HIV disease and instead, will treat HIV infection as a
singular phenomenon.
3. 6 F. Supp. 2d 1073 (W.D. Wis. 1998) (holding that HIV infection is a
disability for the purposes of the ADA).
4. See id. at 1080 (holding that plaintiff could not establish a disability under the
theory established by the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d
934 (1st Cir. 1997)). The circuit court in Bragdon held that HIV impaired the
plaintiff’s major life activity of reproduction, thus bringing plaintiff within the
protections of the ADA. See Bragdon, 107 F.3d at 949. The Supreme Court essentially
affirmed the First Circuit’s theory in Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2213 (1998).
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whether asymptomatic HIV infection is a disability5 for purposes of
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”).6
Both courts held that HIV could be a disability for the purposes of
the ADA, but for markedly different reasons.7 These differing
reasons arise because of the dissimilarities between the plaintiffs.
The Supreme Court in Bragdon involved a woman of child-bearing
age;8 the district court in Happy Time Day Care involved a three-yearold boy.9 The Supreme Court in Bragdon found that the plaintiff was
substantially limited in her major life activity of reproduction.10 The
district court in Happy Time Day Care could not consider this
argumentthree-year-old boys do not reproduce.11 Thus, the district
court was forced to examine other major life activities affected by the
boy’s HIV infection and consider other theories of disability to
determine whether the boy might be disabled for purposes of the
ADA.12
Using the maxim that similar cases should be treated similarly and
dissimilar cases should be treated differently,13 is it appropriate that
asymptomatic HIV plaintiffs must rely on differing theories of
disability for ADA protection? This Comment argues that it is not
appropriate. Although different, the two plaintiffs share one
overarching commonality:
they were both the victims of
discrimination on the basis of their HIV infection. If the plaintiffs’
allegations are true, the defendants in both cases allowed HIV
5. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2200 (noting that the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to review whether the HIV-infected plaintiff was actually disabled); Happy
Time Day Care, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 1074 (framing the issue as whether the plaintiff is
disabled for the purposes of the ADA).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994) (declaring that one purpose of the ADA is to
provide a national mandate for eliminating discrimination against the disabled).
7. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2207 (holding that plaintiff’s HIV infection
substantially impaired her ability to reproduce); Happy Time Day Care, 6 F. Supp. 2d
at 1075 (holding that plaintiff’s HIV infection might substantially impair his major
life activity of caring for himself and that the defendants might have regarded him as
disabled).
8. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2206.
9. See Happy Time Day Care, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 1080 (noting that it is inherently
illogical to inquire as to whether a three-year-old child is substantially impaired as to
the major life activity of reproduction).
10. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2206-07 (deciding that although the plaintiff was still
able to reproduce, danger to her partner and child limited the activity).
11. See Happy Time Day Care, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 1080 (observing that it is illogical for
the court to inquire whether an individual who is not yet capable of “a major life
activity” is limited by an external factor from engaging in that activity).
12. See id. at 1081, 1083 (allowing the plaintiff to proceed on theories that his
HIV infection substantially impaired his major life activity of caring for himself and
that the defendant regarded him as disabled).
13. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1033A-1131B; ARISTOTLE, A POLITICS
1280A-1280B (defining justice as treating like cases in a like manner and unlike cases
in an unlike manner).
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infection to influence their decision about offering public
accommodations to the plaintiffs, thus engaging in discriminatory
activity.14 These cases are alike and should be treated similarly.
By failing to treat HIV infection as a per se disability, the Supreme
Court sanctions the unequal application of the ADA to HIV-infected
individuals by the lower courts.15 The Bragdon decision could allow
some courts to treat reproduction as the only major life activity
affected by HIV infection.16 This could foreclose the litigation of
other, novel major life activities.17 Ironically, the Bragdon decision
could have the paradoxical effect of prohibiting discrimination
against some HIV-infected individuals who are “disabled” while
failing to protect HIV-infected individuals who are not “disabled”
from discrimination based on age, sexual orientation, or
reproductive dysfunction.18 To avoid these uncertainties, future
plaintiffs should abandon the manipulable language of the “actual
disability” prong of the ADA in favor of uniform treatment of HIV
infection under the “regarded as” prong.19
The “regarded as” prong of the ADA clarifies as discrimination any
instance in which a disease or physical impairment, whether real or
imaginary, limiting or not limiting, is a factor in the decision-making
processes of an employer or a public or private accommodation.20
The “regarded as” prong of the ADA creates a tautology whereby the
protections of the statute are triggered by the offense itself—the act
14. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2201 (describing how the defendant dentist refused
to fill an HIV-positive plaintiff’s cavity unless the procedure was performed in a
hospital and the plaintiff paid all of the hospital costs); Happy Time Day Care, 6 F.
Supp. 2d at 1077-78 (recounting how the defendant day care centers refused to
provide the plaintiff with day care after the plaintiff’s aunt revealed that he was HIVinfected).
15. There is disagreement among the members of the Supreme Court as to the
meaning of Bragdon. In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999), Justice
O’Connor construed Bragdon to mean that “whether a person has a disability is an
individualized inquiry.” Id. at 2147. However, in Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 119 S.
Ct. 2162 (1999), Justice Souter used Bragdon to imply that “some impairments may
invariably cause a substantial limitation of a major life activity . . . .” Id. at 2169; cf.
Catherine J. Lanctot, Ad Hoc Decision Making and Per se Prejudice: How Individualizing
the Determination of “Disability” Undermines the ADA, 42 VILL. L. REV. 327, 336-37 (1997)
(demonstrating how ambiguities in the ADA created a split in the circuits leaving
only some HIV-infected individuals protected by the ADA).
16. See infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text (discussing the failure of the
Court to list other major life activities that may fall within the ADA).
17. See infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text (noting also that a “disability”
under the ADA is determined on a case by case basis).
18. See infra Part II (analyzing the types of plaintiffs whose claims may not fall
within the Bragdon holding).
19. See infra Part III (identifying the “regarded as” prong of the ADA as an
alternative prong for future HIV-infected plaintiffs).
20. See infra Part IV (deeming the “regarded as” prong as the most appropriate
remedy for discrimination).
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of discrimination—and not because the victim happens to meet some
particular criterion.21
Part I of this Comment outlines the origins and basic provisions of
the ADA and gives a critical analysis of Bragdon v. Abbott. Part II
examines why the court in the Western District of Wisconsin was
unable to find the plaintiff disabled under the “actual disability”
prong, and identifies other actual and potential plaintiffs for whom
the Supreme Court decision in Bragdon is not a solution. Part III
discusses society’s past and present responses to the HIV disease and
the AIDS epidemic and how these responses can be applied to the
“regarded as” prong of the ADA. Part IV examines the “regarded as”
prong of the ADA in more detail and proposes it as a solution to the
problems faced by the district court in Happy Time Day
Careproblems that plaintiffs will need to contend with in the future.
I. THE ADA AND BRAGDON V. ABBOTT
Although HIV infection and AIDS existed at the drafting of the
ADA, and Congress contemplated the inclusion of HIV and AIDS,
courts have struggled with how to account for HIV infection in the
ADA’s definition of disability.22 The Supreme Court attempted to
settle this issue in Bragdon;23 however, more questions than answers
have resulted from the litigation in Bragdon.
A. Drafting the ADA
The ADA finds its major antecedent in Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehabilitation Act”).24
The
Rehabilitation Act bans disability-based discrimination25 in federal
21. See infra notes 184-98 and accompanying text (arguing that the focus of ADA
analysis should be whether a defendant’s negative reactions to plaintiff’s disability is
the primary source of defendant’s behavior).
22. See Rhonda K. Jenkins, Note, Square Pegs and Round Holes: HIV and the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 637, 646-47 (1996) (arguing that
because the ADA borrowed language from the Rehabilitation Act, the “relatively new
phenomenon and [] completely unique disease concept” of HIV does not fit well
into the ADA definition of disability).
23. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2207 (1998) (holding that for
plaintiff, a woman of child-bearing age, HIV infection is a disability because it limits
her major life activity of reproducing).
24. Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994). Section 504
provides that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by
reason of his or her disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance . . . .” Id.
25. The original language of the statute used the term “handicap” instead of
“disability.” In 1992, Congress amended the language of the Rehabilitation Act by
substituting “handicap” with “disability.” See Rehabilitation Act Amendments of
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programs.26 When activists sought to expand the Rehabilitation Act
to include all realms of daily life, some people with disabilities
lobbied Congress to amend the Civil Rights Act of 196427 to include
disability.28 Many legislators, however, believed that the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 was not written adequately to address all of the issues
faced by people with disabilities,29 and others feared that new debate
over the Civil Rights Act of 1964 might weaken rather than expand its
scope.30 As a result of these concerns, a free-standing civil rights bill
for people with disabilities emerged.31 Congress acted swiftly on the
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-569, § 102(p)(32), 106 Stat. 4344, 4360.
26. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)-(b) (1994) (prohibiting discrimination against
otherwise qualified individuals with disabilities by any government agency or private
entity that receives federal assistance).
During the years between the passage of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Congress also dealt with discrimination on
the basis of disability in education, voting accessibility, the airline industry, and
housing. See Education for All Handicapped Children Act, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89
Stat. 773 (1975), amended and renamed Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of
1990 (“IDEA”), Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1141 (codified as amended at 20
U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1994)) (giving all children with disabilities the right to public
education); Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat.
1619 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1994)) (protecting disabled
persons from discrimination in housing); Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and
Handicapped Act, Pub. L. No. 98-435, 98 Stat. 1678 (1984) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 1973ee (1994)) (improving access to voting for handicapped and
elderly); Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 94103, 89 Stat. 773 (1975), amended and renamed Developmental Disabilities Assistance
and Bill of Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 98-527, 98 Stat. 2662 (1984) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6083 (1994)) (granting mentally retarded persons rights to
habilitation and protection from harm); Air Carrier Access Act, Pub. L. No. 99-435,
100 Stat. 1080 (1986) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 41705 (1994))
(establishing airline procedures to provide accommodations to the disabled). See
generally Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and
Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413,
427-28 (1991) (describing the progression of anti-discrimination statutes from the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to the ADA).
27. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1965) (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h-6 (1994)) (prohibiting discrimination based on race, color,
religion, national origin, or sex).
28. See Burgdorf, supra note 26, at 429 (explaining that attempts to amend the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include disability continued through the mid-1980s).
29. See id. at 429-31 (writing that some commentators asserted that
discrimination on the basis of disability had unique aspects not shared with
discrimination on the basis of race and gender). People with disabilities sometimes
require certain accommodations to participate in protected activities—no such
accommodations are required to eliminate race or gender discrimination. See Robert
L. Burgdorf Jr. & Christopher G. Bell, Eliminating Discrimination Against Physically and
Mentally Handicapped Persons: A Statutory Blueprint, 8 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L.
REP. 64, 66-69 (1984).
30. See Burgdorf, supra note 26, at 429.
31. See id. at 432 (writing that the proposal for a free-standing civil rights bill to
protect people with disabilities first appeared in legal literature in 1984). This
proposal appeared in Burgdorf and Bell’s article. See Burgdorf & Bell, supra note 29.
Current efforts to pass a civil rights law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation have also dispensed with the idea of amending existing civil rights
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ADAit was introduced first into the Senate on April 28, 1988,32 and
then approved by overwhelming majorities by both houses of
Congress on July 13, 1990.33
The ADA applies to three kinds of covered entities: employers,34
public programs,35 and public accommodations.36 The definition of
disability is identical for all three kinds of covered entities,37 as is the
framework of analysis.38 Virtually all employers, public programs, and
public accommodations are included in the ADA’s list of covered
entities.39
Congress did not write the ADA to remedy discrimination only on
the basis of certain disabilities. The ADA does not list any particular
conditions or impairments that are to be considered disabilities.
legislation and instead are focusing on a free-standing model, like the ADA. See
Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1999, S. 1276, 106th Cong. (1999);
Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1999, H.R. 2355, 106th Cong. (1999) (both
are unenacted bills prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basis of sexual
orientation).
32. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1988, S. 2345, 100th Cong. (1988), 134
CONG. REC. S9357 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1988) (introduced by Sen. Harkin). The ADA
was introduced into the House of Representatives the next day, April 29, 1988. See
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1988, H.R. 4498, 100th Cong. (1988), 134 CONG.
REC. H9600 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1988) (introduced by Rep. Kasich).
33. See 136 CONG. REC. H17251, 17280 (daily ed. July 12, 1990) (reporting that
the House of Representatives passed the ADA in a vote of 377 to 28); 136 CONG. REC.
S17,177, 17203 (daily ed. July 13, 1990) (reporting that the Senate passed the ADA in
a vote of 91 to 6). See generally Burgdorf, supra note 26, at 433-34 (describing the
passage of the ADA). President Bush signed the ADA on July 26, 1990. In his
remarks upon signing, President Bush commented,
[The ADA] signals the end to the unjustified segregation and exclusion of
persons with disabilities from the mainstream of American life. As the
Declaration of Independence has been a beacon for people all over the
world seeking freedom, it is my hope that the Americans with Disabilities Act
will likewise come to be a model for the choices and opportunities of future
generations around the world.
Statement by President George Bush Upon Signing S. 933, 1990 PUB. PAPERS 1070,
1071 (July 26, 1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 601, 602.
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (1994) (defining “covered entity” for employment
purposes as an employer with 15 or more employees, an employment agency, a labor
organization, or a joint management committee).
35. See id. § 12131 (defining “public program” as a state or local government, a
department or agency of a state or local government, the National Railroad
Passenger Corporation, or any commuter authority).
36. See id. § 12181 (defining “public accommodation” as a range of stores, service
providers, educational institutions, and places of recreation).
37. See id. § 12102(2) (defining “person with a disability” for the entire ADA).
38. See id. § 12111(8); id. § 12131(2); id. § 12182(a) (all three frameworks of
analysis using a comparable standard to evaluate discrimination on the basis of
disability).
39. See Burgdorf, supra note 26, at 454-56, 465, 470-72. As a result of the
comprehensive definition of covered entity, the term “covered entity” will be used in
this Comment to refer interchangeably to employers, public accommodations, and
public programs to avoid the implication that this Comment refers only to one kind
of covered entity.
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Instead, the ADA takes a “big tent” approach, thereby allowing
anyone who fits the definition set forth by the statute to take refuge
under it. The ADA defines disability as:
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such impairment; or
40
(C) being regarded as having such impairment.

The definition of disability used by the ADA is not original;
Congress borrowed it from the Rehabilitation Act.41 This definition is
important because it expresses the congressional intent not to limit
the class of those eligible to sue under the ADA (except persons with
conditions specifically excluded42 in the statute itself).
Specifically,
legislators
were
concerned
about
the
comprehensiveness of any list of conditions.43 Congress intended the
ADA definition of disability to be flexible enough to be responsive to
new conditions, diseases, and impairments as they emerged and
affected the population.44
Despite the relative newness of HIV and AIDS at the drafting of the
ADA, the legislative history contains many examples of the impact of
the AIDS epidemic on American lives.45 The record also reflects an
intent by legislators to include AIDS and HIV infection as conditions
covered by the ADA.46 Congress did not map out how an individual
40. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C).
41. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 1296, 2202 (1998) (commenting that the
definition of “disability” in the ADA is almost verbatim the definition of
“handicapped individual” in the Rehabilitation Act).
42. But see 42 U.S.C. § 12211 (excluding sexual orientation, as well as certain
sexual disorders and mental illnesses, from the list of impairments that could be
considered disabilities under the statute).
43. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 51 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303, 333 (describing Congress’ concern that in positing a list of protected disabilities,
other disabling conditions that emerged later might be excluded).
44. See id., reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 333 (discussing reasons for not
developing a list of conditions covered by the ADA and then giving a non-exclusive
list of covered conditions, among them HIV infection).
45. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearing on S. 933 Before the Subcomm.
on the Handicapped of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 101st Cong. 102
(1989) (statement of Betty and Emory Corey) (describing the Coreys’ difficulties in
finding a funeral home that would provide services and a burial for their six-year-old
foster daughter who died of AIDS); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1988: Hearing on
S. 2345 Before the Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human
Resources and Before the Subcomm. on Select Educ. of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor,
100th Cong. 76-78 (1988) (statement of Belinda Mason) (describing discrimination
that she faced on a daily basis because of her HIV positive status, and describing
discrimination faced by other rural residents who were infected with HIV or were
associated with people infected with HIV).
46. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearing on S. 933 Before the Subcomm.
on the Handicapped of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 101st Cong. 82526 (1989) (statement of Hon. Lowell Weiker, Jr.) (emphasizing that the ADA has
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with HIV or AIDS would establish a prima facie claim under the ADA,
but did include in the legislative history a Department of Justice
memorandum determining that HIV infection and AIDS could be
found to be disabilities for the purposes of the Rehabilitation Act
under an actual or “regarded as” disabled theory.47 As a result of the
ambiguity as to how HIV should best be litigated under the ADA, i.e.,
under an actual or “regarded as” theory, some commentators have
suggested that the ADA be amended to mention specifically AIDS
and HIV infection as per se disabilities.48
support from every segment of the disability community, including those infected
with HIV); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1988: Hearing on S. 2345 Before the Subcomm.
on the Handicapped of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources and Before the
Subcomm. on Select Educ. of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 100th Cong. 39-41
(1988) (statement of Adm. James Watkins, Chairperson, President’s Commission on
the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic) (insisting that comprehensive
legislation prohibiting discrimination on basis of HIV seropositivity status is critical in
addressing HIV epidemic); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 51 (1989), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 333 (explaining congressional intent in not positing a list of
protected disabilities, yet providing an exemplary list of conditions covered, among
them HIV infection); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(III) at 28 n.18, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 451 n.18 (quoting from memorandum written by the then Acting
Assistant Attorney General that concluded HIV is an impairment under the “first test
of the definition” because it substantially limits a major life activity); S. REP. NO. 101116, at 19 (1989) (referring to the Presidential Commission on the HIV Epidemic’s
recommendation for comprehensive anti-discrimination protection for people with
symptomatic or asymptomatic HIV infection); id. at 22 (listing HIV infection among
the conditions that the ADA is intended to cover).
Congress so clearly intended that HIV infection be covered by the ADA that it used
individuals infected with HIV as examples when describing prohibited,
discriminatory activities. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 65, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 347 (stating that under the ADA an employer could not transfer
an employee with HIV to a different job without the employee’s consent); H.R. REP.
NO. 101-485(II), at 79, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 361 (explaining that
excluding people who currently use illegal drugs from the definition of “disability”
does not exclude people who take experimental drugs for epilepsy, mental illness or
AIDS if those drugs are taken under the supervision of a physician); H.R. REP. NO.
101-485(II), at 106, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 389 (providing the example
that a drug treatment center could refuse to treat someone who is not a drug addict
but could not refuse to treat a drug addict who is HIV positive); H.R. REP. NO. 101485(III), at 39, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 461 (providing as an example of
prohibited activity under the association prong of the ADA an employer who
discharges an employee because the employee does volunteer work for people with
AIDS).
47. See Memorandum from Douglas W. Kmiec, Acting Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, to Arthur B. Culvahouse, Jr., Counsel
to the President (Sept. 27, 1988), reprinted in Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989:
Hearings on S. 933 Before the Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Senate Comm. on Labor
and Human Resources, 101st Cong. 338-68 (1989) (interpreting the Supreme Court’s
decision in School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987), to extend
disability coverage to symptomatic or asymptomatic HIV infection either under
actual or “regarded as” disabled theory).
48. See Jeffrey A. Mello, Limitations of the Americans with Disabilities Act in Protecting
Individuals with HIV from Employment Discrimination, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 73, 112-13
(1994) (suggesting that Congress amend the ADA to specify that HIV infection is a
per se disability or that state and local legislators pass laws to have the same effect).
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B. Bragdon v. Abbott
Bragdon is the first Supreme Court case that dealt directly with HIV
or AIDS.49 Sidney Abbott, a Maine resident who was infected with
HIV but displayed no symptoms of infection,50 sought to have a cavity
filled by a dentist, Dr. Randon Bragdon.51 After Dr. Bragdon told Ms.
Abbott that he would only fill the cavity in a hospital at her expense,52
Ms. Abbott filed a lawsuit53 claiming that she suffered discrimination
because of an actual disability, her HIV infection.54 The federal
district court in Maine agreed and granted Ms. Abbott summary
judgment.55 The First Circuit affirmed,56 and the Supreme Court
affirmed in part and remanded for more proceedings to determine
whether Ms. Abbott posed a “direct threat” of infection to Dr.
See, e.g., Chai Felblum, Seminar, Litigating ADA claims after Bragdon v. Abbott,
National Lesbian and Gay Lawyers Association’s Lavendar Law Conference (Oct. 16,
1998) (speaking as an ADA drafter, Prof. Feldblum remarked, “[w]e messed up,”
because language of the statute can be manipulated so as to not protect certain HIVinfected individuals).
49. See Jenkins, supra note 22, at 640 (commenting that as of 1996, the Supreme
Court had not heard a case determining whether HIV infection is a physical disability
for purposes of ADA).
50. The Supreme Court noted in Bragdon that the term “asymptomatic HIV
infection” is a misnomer. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 1296, 2204 (1998). The
Court stated that “after the symptoms associated with the initial stage subside, the
disease enters what is referred to sometimes as its asymptomatic phase. The term is a
misnomer, in some respects, for clinical features persist throughout, including
lymphadenopathy, dermatological disorders, oral lesions, and bacterial infections.”
Id.
This is not new information. In 1988, Surgeon General C. Everett Koop expressed
a similar sentiment in a letter to Acting Assistant Attorney General Douglas W.
Kmiec. See Letter from C. Everett Koop, Surgeon General, to Douglas W. Kmiec,
Acting Assistant Attorney General (July 29, 1988), reprinted in Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings on S. 933 Before the Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 101st Cong. 367-68 (1989) (stating that
“from a purely scientific perspective, persons with HIV infection are clearly
impaired . . . . Like a person in the early stages of cancer, they appear to be
outwardly healthy but are in fact seriously ill.”).
51. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2201 (reciting circumstances leading to ADA claim).
52. See id. (stating that plaintiff would have to pay hospital costs in addition to
normal dentist’s fees).
53. See generally Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580 (D. Me. 1995).
The Washington Post reports that the events culminating in the Supreme Court
case were not an accident. Dr. Bragdon had been outspoken about his views that
health care workers must take special precautions when treating patients infected
with HIV. See Joan Biskupic, Is HIV Covered by Disability Act?; Justices to Hear Case
Against Dentist Who Refused Office Care, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1998, at A3 (describing
the events leading up to the lawsuit). Also, Ms. Abbott was part of a nation-wide
movement challenging health care professionals who refuse to treat people infected
with HIV. See id.
54. See Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. at 595.
55. See id. at 586 (holding that plaintiff was, as a matter of law, disabled for the
purposes of the ADA).
56. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 942 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that HIV
infection is a disability for fecund women).
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Bragdon.57
In Bragdon, the Supreme Court addressed two major issues that
lower courts had considered and on which they had reached
conflicting results: whether asymptomatic HIV infection is an
impairment;58 and whether reproduction is a major life activity as
contemplated by the ADA.59
Utilizing the best available medical knowledge about HIV, Justice
Anthony Kennedy, in his majority opinion, described the debilitating
effects of HIV on bodily systems60 and even questioned the accuracy
of the term “asymptomatic phase.”61 Justice Kennedy specifically
referred to HIV’s destructive impact at the cellular level, writing
“infection with HIV causes immediate abnormalities in a person’s
blood, and the infected person’s white cell count continues to drop
throughout the course of the disease, even when the attack is
concentrated in the lymph nodes.”62 Using a very common-sense
approach, and after looking at the realities of HIV disease, Justice
Kennedy concluded,
[i]n light of these facts, HIV infection must be regarded as a
physiological disorder with a constant and detrimental effect on
the infected person’s hemic and lymphatic systems from the
moment of infection. HIV infection satisfies the statutory and
regulatory definition of a physical impairment during every stage of
63
the disease.

After establishing that all stages of the HIV infection are
impairments, Justice Kennedy then examined whether Ms. Abbott
was impaired as to a major life activity. Justice Kennedy expressed

57. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2213 (1998) (holding that plaintiff was
disabled for purposes of ADA and remanding for a determination of whether
plaintiff posed significant risk of transmitting HIV to defendant).
58. Compare Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., 123 F.3d 156, 169 (4th Cir.
1997) (holding that asymptomatic HIV infection is never an impairment), with
Bragdon, 107 F.3d at 939 (holding that asymptomatic HIV infection is an
impairment).
59. Compare Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 915 F. Supp. 102 (S.D. Iowa
1995) (holding that reproduction is not a major life activity), with Pacourek v. Inland
Steel Co., 916 F. Supp. 797 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (holding that reproduction is a major life
activity).
Also at issue in Bragdon was the question of when someone poses a “direct threat”
of infection to co-workers and service providers. This issue, however, is beyond the
scope of this Comment.
60. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2204 (discussing the effects of HIV infection on the
hemic and lymphatic systems).
61. See id. (referring to the term “asymptomatic” as a misnomer because “clinical
features persist throughout”).
62. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2204.
63. Id.
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willingness to consider other activities,64 but Ms. Abbott had identified
reproduction as the major life activity that her HIV infection
impaired.65 Accordingly, Justice Kennedy limited review to issues
raised at the trial level.66
Previously, courts were split as to whether reproduction qualified as
a major life activity for the purposes of the ADA.67
Justice
Department regulations give a partial list of major life activities,
suggesting activities such as walking, sitting, standing, and reaching,
but they provide no guidelines for determining other qualifying
activities.68 Justice Kennedy rejected arguments that major life
activities had to meet any specific set of criteria.69 Instead, Justice
Kennedy simply, and sensibly, observed that “reproduction and the
sexual dynamics surrounding it are central to the life process itself.”70
64. See id. at 2204-05 (acknowledging other possible major life activities).
Specifically Justice Kennedy writes,
Given the pervasive, and invariably fatal, course of the disease, its effect on
major life activities of many sorts might have been relevant to our inquiry.
Respondent and a number of amici make arguments about HIV’s profound
impact on almost every phase of the infected person’s life. . . . We have little
doubt that had different parties brought the suit they would have maintained
that an HIV infection imposes substantial limitations on other major life
activities.
Id. (citations omitted). Amici argued other substantially impaired activities include
caring for one’s self, sexual activity, and living life. See Brief for AIDS Action Council,
Supporting Respondents, Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (No. 97-156), available
in 1998 WL 47252, at *23-28 (arguing that “virtually everything involved in caring for
oneself day to day, from the profound to the trivial, is altered forever by an HIV
diagnosis”); Brief for Infectious Diseases Society of America, Supporting
Respondents, Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (No. 97-156), available in 1998 WL
47250, at *7-11 (arguing that HIV infection substantially limits one’s ability to care
for oneself because of strict drug regimens, parasites such as cryptosporidium,
inability to use vaccinations that contain live viruses or bacteria, and constant
attention to other factors that might depress an individual’s immune system).
65. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580, 586 (D. Me. 1995) (commenting
that plaintiff, who identified reproduction as her major life activity, was substantially
impaired by HIV infection).
66. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2205 (limiting review to whether HIV infection
substantially impairs reproduction).
67. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
68. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.104(2) (1999) (giving a non-exhaustive list of “major life
activities” and not providing a framework for determining other “major life
activities”); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(2) (1999) (same); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1999)
(same).
The Supreme Court questioned whether any agency had been delegated the
authority to interpret the term “disability.” See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S.
Ct. 2139, 2145 (1999) (parsing the grants of agency authority). Because the Court
determined that this issue did not need to be decided to resolve the dispute, the
Court did not decide what deference should be given to these regulations. See id. at
2146 (declining to rule on the issue).
69. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2205 (observing that the breadth of the word
“major” in “major life activity” precludes attempts to limit it to “public, economic, or
daily” activities).
70. See id. at 2205.
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Therefore, reproduction qualified as a major life activity under the
definition of the ADA.
Finally, Ms. Abbott had to demonstrate that her HIV infection
substantially impaired her ability to reproduce. Justice Kennedy
clarified that “impaired” does not mean “rendered impossible.”71 Ms.
Abbott did not have to demonstrate that reproduction was impossible
for her, but merely that her ability to conceive and bear a healthy
child without risk to the father or the child was limited.72 Citing the
best available research, Justice Kennedy found that a twenty percent
risk of HIV transmission to the father73 and eight percent risk of HIV
transmission to the child, with AZT therapy,74 was a substantial
impairment on Ms. Abbott’s ability to reproduce and therefore, she
was eligible for protection under the ADA.75
Although the Supreme Court reached a conclusion that
determined Ms. Abbott’s HIV infection to be covered by the ADA,
not all people infected with HIV will benefit from the Bragdon
71. See id. at 2206 (“The [ADA] addresses substantial limitations on major life
activities, not utter inabilities.”).
72. See id. (formulating the test for whether plaintiff’s ability to reproduce was
substantially impaired).
73. See id. (referring to studies that indicate the likelihood of HIV transmission
from an infected woman to an uninfected man during unprotected intercourse).
74. See id. (referring to studies that indicate the likelihood of HIV transmission
from an infected mother to her unborn child with AZT therapy). Azidothymidine,
commonly known as AZT, is sold under the brand name Retrovir and referred to by
scientists as “Ziduvidine.” See Caitlin C. Ryan & Ronald Bogard, Medical Basics, in
AIDS BENCHBOOK SUPPLEMENT 1, 12 (Michele A. Zavos ed., 1994). AZT first became
available in 1987. See id. AZT, like other commonly known HIV drugs such as ddI,
ddC, d4T and 3TC, is a nucleoside analog reverse transcriptase inhibitor that
interferes with HIV’s ability to transfer its genetic material into DNA and infect a
healthy cell. See Janine Maenza & Charles Flexner, Combination Antiretroviral Therapy
for HIV Infection (last modified May 19, 1999) <http://www.aafp.org/afp/980600ap/
maenza.html> (describing how nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitors work, as
well as discussing proper dosing, side effects, and cost).
75. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2207 (holding that Ms. Abbott is actually disabled
under the ADA and declining to rule on whether HIV infection is a per se disability
under ADA).
Justice Kennedy was not persuaded that the slight statistical risk of infection to the
child was not a limitation, thus stating that “it cannot be said as a matter of law that
an 8% risk of transmitting a dread and fatal disease to one’s child does not represent
a substantial limitation on reproduction.” See id. at 2206.
This decision was consistent with the vast weight of precedent holding that HIV
infection is a disability for the purposes of the ADA. See Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d
1439, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994); Doe v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1455, 1459 (11th Cir. 1990);
Austin v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corrections, 876 F. Supp. 1437, 1465 (E.D. Pa. 1995);
EEOC v. Chemtech Int’l Corp., No. Civ. A. H-94-2848, 1995 WL 608355 at *1, 4 A.D.
Cases 1466, 7 N.D.L.R.P. 193 (S.D. Tex. July 21, 1995); Robinson v. Henry Ford
Health Sys., 892 F. Supp. 176, 180 (E.D. Mich. 1994); Howe v. Hull, 873 F. Supp. 72,
78 (N.D. Ohio 1994); Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C., 862 F. Supp. 1310, 1318-20
(E.D. Pa. 1994); T.E.P. v. Leavitt, 840 F. Supp. 110, 111 (D. Utah 1993); Doe v.
District of Columbia, 796 F. Supp. 559, 568 (D.D.C. 1992); Glanz v. Vernick, 756 F.
Supp. 632, 635 (D. Mass. 1991).
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decision. Justice Kennedy carefully observed that other activities
could be major life activities affected by HIV infection, but he neither
listed any specific activities76 nor set out any criteria to determine a
major life activity.77 Although the Bragdon decision did not foreclose
the possibility that HIV infection is a disability for purposes of the
ADA, it failed to hold that HIV infection is a per se disability and did
not establish a framework of analysis that all future plaintiffs could
use.78
II. UNITED STATES V. HAPPY TIME DAY CARE CENTER79 AND OTHER
PAST AND FUTURE PLAINTIFFS FOR WHOM THE BRAGDON APPROACH
IS NOT USEFUL
Happy Time Day Care is an example of an HIV-infected plaintiff who
encountered difficulty in tailoring his case to the language of the
ADA.80 While Bragdon was pending before the Supreme Court, Judge
Barbara Crabb in the Western District of Wisconsin considered Happy
Time Day Care,81 a case that, regardless of Bragdon’s outcome, did not
fall neatly within the usual ADA framework. L.W., a three-year-old
boy infected with HIV, lived with his aunt Rosetta McNuckle in Beloit,
Wisconsin.82 L.W.’s aunt, who worked nights and slept during the
morning and early afternoon, needed day care for L.W. during these
times.83 McNuckle obtained a list of day care providers from Rock
County Human Services and began to inquire about day care from
the listed providers.84 McNuckle disclosed her nephew’s HIV status to
each of three day care centers she contacted, Defendants Kiddie
Ranch, ABC Nursery, and Happy Time Day Care Center. All three
declined to take L.W. into their day care programs.85
76. Justice Kennedy observes that it is “legalistic” to limit the discussion of major
life activities affected by HIV infection to reproduction and suggests that other
plaintiffs might present other activities as well. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2205. Justice
Kennedy did not, however, present even a partial list of other possible major life
activities, or mention which activities had been suggested by amici to be major life
activities impacted by HIV infection. See id.; see also supra note 64 (discussing major
life activities that amici suggested were activities impacted by HIV infection).
77. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2205 (establishing that “major” suggests comparative
importance, and rejecting the notion that major life activities must have an economic
or public aspect, but not establishing any test for a major life activity).
78. See id. at 2207 (declining to rule that HIV infection is a per se disability and
affirming that disability for the purposes of the ADA is an individualized inquiry).
79. 6 F. Supp. 2d 1073 (W.D. Wis. 1998).
80. See id. at 1073.
81. See id. at 1084.
82. See id. at 1077 (describing plaintiff’s living situation).
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 1077-78 (describing McNuckle’s attempts to find day care for her
nephew).
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This case is a clear example of discrimination on the basis of
disability—HIV status.
Nevertheless, L.W. was required to
demonstrate that because of his HIV infection he was a member of a
protected class.86 Judge Crabb had difficulties finding that L.W. fit
the language of the ADA’s actual disability prong because most courts
previously relied on reproduction as the major life activity impaired
by HIV infection.87 As a three-year-old boy, L.W. could not reproduce
and therefore, Judge Crabb could not rely on the First Circuit’s
formulation of disability used for Ms. Abbott in Bragdon.88
Judge Crabb instead chose to examine other potential major life
activities: living, growing, and socializing.89 Judge Crabb ultimately
found that a genuine issue of disputed fact existed as to whether L.W.
was impaired in his ability to care for himself,90 but rejected
arguments that L.W. was impaired as to growing and socializing91 and
also rejected living as a major life activity.92 Although Judge Crabb
did not dismiss the plaintiff’s claim altogether, she had difficulty
finding that the plaintiff met the class requirements under the actual
disability prong because he was incapable of reproducing.93
86. See id. at 1078 (stating that plaintiff must first establish that he has a disability
under the ADA).
87. See id. at 1080-81 (holding that L.W., as a child, cannot reproduce and
therefore, cannot be substantially impaired in the major life activity of
reproduction).
88. See id. at 1080 (determining that major life activity must be an activity
available to that individual).
89. See id. at 1081 (considering major life activities other than reproduction for
an HIV-infected three-year-old boy).
90. See id. (finding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether
plaintiff’s HIV status impaired his ability to care for himself in the form of fighting
infections). But cf. Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240, 243 (E.D. La.
1995) (holding that a plaintiff cannot “bootstrap” or argue that she is limited in an
activity particular to the bodily system that is impaired). The Zatarain court used this
reasoning to hold that a condition in plaintiff’s reproductive system could not be
argued to impair her major life activity of reproducing. See id. at 243.
91. See Happy Time Day Care, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 1081 (accepting growing and
socializing as major life activities but finding that plaintiff grew at a proportional rate
to his peers and that he socialized normally).
92. See id. at 1081-82 (holding that to identify “living” as a major life activity is
“tautological” and too expansive).
93. See id. at 1081 (determining that a three-year-old child cannot claim
reproduction as his major life activity impaired by HIV infection); see also Knapp v.
Northwestern Univ., 101 F.3d 473, 481 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that not all
impairments affecting a major life activity are substantially limiting). Judge Crabb,
however, also found a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendants regarded
L.W. as impaired. See Happy Time Day Care, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 1083-84; see also School
Bd. of Nassau v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (finding that the negative reactions of
others can be substantially limiting); cf. 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B, at 621 (1999)
(stating that “[t]he perception of the private entity or public accommodation is a key
element of this test”).
Interestingly, courts heard several cases during the 1980s involving school children
infected with HIV. See Martinez v. School Bd. of Hillsborough County, 861 F.2d
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L.W. is not the only young HIV-infected individual to have
difficulty demonstrating his inclusion in the class of those defined as
actually disabled by the ADA. In Ennis v. National Ass’n of Business &
Educational Radio, Inc.,94 an association case,95 the mother of a child
infected with HIV was fired for failing to perform the duties of her
job.96 The plaintiff, Ennis, claimed that the defendant, the National
Association of Business and Educational Radio sought to exclude her
and her HIV-infected son, A.J., from their insurance policy to avoid
paying high premiums for the catastrophic cost of care that A.J.
would require.97 Because the court heard this case on appeal from a
motion for summary judgment, the record was not well developed as
to how A.J. was substantially impaired as to a major life activity.98 As a
result, the court noted that it would be forced to determine that HIV
infection is a per se disability for the purposes of the ADA.99 Holding
that a case-by-case approach is the appropriate method for

1502, 1506 (11th Cir. 1988) (deciding without analysis that plaintiff who is HIVinfected has a disability for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act and therefore, cannot
be denied access to a public education); Thomas v. Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist.,
662 F. Supp. 376, 381-82 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (finding that the plaintiff who was infected
with HIV has a disability for purposes of Rehabilitation Act and is eligible to attend
kindergarten with other children); Ray v. School Dist. of DeSoto County, 666 F.
Supp. 1524, 1538 (M.D. Fla. 1987) (granting preliminary injunction of parents of
children infected with HIV to admit children into regular classroom settings). These
cases were brought under the Rehabilitation Act and the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act. See Martinez, 861 F.2d at 1504; Thomas, 662 F. Supp. at
381. Although the definitions of “handicap” used in those statutes were virtually
identical to the definition of disability used in the ADA, courts hearing such cases
assumed that HIV infection or AIDS was a handicap and did not scrutinize the
plaintiffs’ claim that they were members of a protected class. See Thomas, 662 F.
Supp. at 382; see also District 27 Community Sch. Bd. v. Board of Educ., 502 N.Y.S.2d
325, 341 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (holding that automatically excluding from school those
children “handicapped” with AIDS violated the Rehabilitation Act).
94. 53 F.3d 55 (4th Cir. 1995).
95. The ADA protects anyone who has an association with someone who has a
disability from discrimination on the basis of that association if the covered entity has
knowledge of that association. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4) (1994).
“Association” is not limited to relatives and spouses but has been defined by
Department of Justice regulations to include people who do volunteer work with
people with disabilities and other companions of people with disabilities. See 28
C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B, at 633 (1999) (describing which individuals are covered by the
association prong of the ADA); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app., at 360 (1999) (providing an
example of volunteer work).
96. See Ennis, 53 F.3d at 56 (discussing reasons given by defendant for plaintiff’s
dismissal).
97. See id. at 57 (giving the plaintiff’s explanation of situation).
98. See id. at 60 (noting that the record was not well developed at this stage of the
litigation).
99. See id. (stating that because no evidence existed in the record that the
plaintiff was impaired or was regarded as having an impairment, if the court held
that the plaintiff was disabled, the court then would have to conclude that HIVpositive status is a per se disability).
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determining a disability,100 the court assumed for the purposes of this
case that A.J. was disabled under the ADA because it could decide the
case on other grounds.101
L.W. and A.J. are two examples of children who found it difficult to
present their cases under the current ADA as it relates to HIV
infection. Children represent a small but important portion of those
living with HIV in the United States.102 Although advances in medical
science have reduced the number of pediatric AIDS cases, children
are frequently the victims of the most invidious forms of
discrimination on the basis of HIV status.103 Children, however, are
not the only potential plaintiffs for whom reproduction is a
contentious issue.
Some commentators have suggested that other segments of the
population should be precluded from positing reproduction as the
major life activity affected by their HIV infection.104 Post-menopausal
women,105 impotent men,106 those who avail themselves of new
100. See id. at 59 (“We believe that the plain language of the provision requires
that a finding of disability be made on an individually-individual basis.”).
101. See id. at 57 (affirming the lower court’s decision because the plaintiff failed
to present enough evidence to show that defendant employer’s proffered reason for
her discharge was a pretext for discrimination).
102. See Ann Kurth, An Overview of Women and HIV Disease, in UNTIL THE CURE:
CARING FOR WOMEN WITH HIV 1, 2 (Ann Kurth ed., 1993) (noting that from 1981 to
1992 pediatric AIDS cases remained approximately 1.5% of total AIDS caseload);
Pediatrics (Screening) Report Calls for Routine Prenatal HIV Testing, HEALTH LETTER ON
THE CDC, Nov. 2, 1998, available in 1998 WL 8783612 (reporting that as result of AZT
treatment, the number of new pediatric AIDS cases due to transmission during
pregnancy dropped by approximately 43% between 1992 and 1996); David Brown,
Routine Prenatal Testing Urged: Panel Favors End to Pre-Test Counseling That Some Doctors
Find a Barrier, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1998, at A3 (reporting that between 400 and
2,000 babies are born with HIV infection each year in United States).
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”), 8,461 or
1.2% of the total reported AIDS cases have been among children under five. See
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 10 HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REPORT
11 (Year-end ed., No. 2) (1998) [hereinafter HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REPORT].
103. See Achy Obejas, Ryan’s Town Remembers It’s Been More Than a Decade Since AIDS
Struck Fear of the Unknown in the Collective Heart of Kokomo, Indiana. Its Citizens, Vilified
by the Media, Still Carry Scars of Guilt and Resentment, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 28, 1998, available
in 1998 WL 2910642 (profiling Ryan White’s home town, Kokomo, Indiana, ten years
after he was expelled from school, and examining invidious discrimination he faced
from his classmates and their parents).
104. See Theresa A. Schneider, Note, Stretching the Limits of the ADA: Asymptomatic
HIV-Positive Status as Disability in Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998), 77 NEB. L.
REV. 206, 221 (1998) (arguing that certain groups, because of age or sexual
orientation, do not reproduce and therefore, should not be allowed to identify
reproduction as a major life activity for purposes of ADA).
105. According to the CDC, there are about 2,500 cases of AIDS among women 55
and over and heterosexual contact is responsible for 69% of these cases. See Andrea
Fine, Here’s Another Face of HIV, and This One’s Old and Wrinkled, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 2,
1997, available in 1997 WL 3606195 (discussing HIV infection among older people).
During an eleven month period ending in April 1997, the number of AIDS cases
diagnosed among seniors 65 and older in Florida rose 13%, double the rate of
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advances in reproductive science,107 and people with reproductive
disorders potentially face similar hurdles. Gay men and lesbians face
specific obstacles in their attempts to argue that their reproduction is
impaired. In a recent Fourth Circuit case, Runnebaum v. NationsBank
of Maryland, N.A.,108 the court remained skeptical of an openly gay
bank employee’s argument that his HIV infection impaired his ability
to reproduce.109 One commentator went so far as to say that a finding
that homosexual men reproduce is an “absurdit[y].”110
These peripheral debates as to who should be allowed to claim
reproduction as a major life activity are not without merit. The First
increase among adolescents. See Diane C. Lade, Support on Way for HIV Seniors, SUNSENTINEL, Feb. 18, 1998, at 1A, available in 1998 WL 3247128 (discussing HIV
infection rates among Florida senior citizens).
Older people, men and women, are not immune to HIV infection. In fact, the
contrary is true. Because of their age, the immune systems of older people are
weaker, thus making it easier for them to contract HIV. See William A. Woolery,
Occult HIV Infection: Diagnosis and Treatment of Older Patients, GERIATRICS, Nov. 1, 1997,
at 51-56 (informing doctors of existence of HIV among older people, how to
diagnose HIV infection among older people, and how to treat HIV infection among
older people). Additionally, older women are more likely to develop vaginal
“disruptions” during intercourse, which increases the likelihood of HIV transmission.
See id. See generally Edward Helmore, Carefree Sex Rides into the Sunset, EVENING
STANDARD, June 30, 1998, at 23 (discussing how post-menopausal women in South
Florida nursing homes do not feel that they need to use condoms during sexual
intercourse because they can no longer become pregnant).
Men and women age 65 or older have constituted 9,284 or 1.3% of the total cases
of AIDS in the United States. See HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REPORT, supra note 102, at
16.
106. See John Gallagher, What Goes Up Must Come Down, THE ADVOCATE, June 23,
1998, at 60 (writing that protease inhibitors and Viagra, a popular drug used to treat
impotency, should not be taken together).
107. See Lisa Frazier, Seeking a Safe Path Toward Fatherhood; Process Aims to Help HIV
Patients, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 1999, at A1 (outlining a new and relatively inexpensive
process, called “sperm washing,” which removes HIV from semen to allow the female
partners of men infected with HIV to conceive and bear healthy children).
108. 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
109. See id. at 172 (implying that gays and lesbians have no interest in procreating
and therefore, are not disabled).
110. See Schneider, supra note 104, at 221. Schneider writes:
Without this individualized inquiry, absurdities would naturally result. For
example, homosexual men . . . that are asymptomatic HIV positive could
similarly argue that their major life activity of reproduction is limited by their
infection. However, since sexual orientation . . . , not their infection, has
precluded reproduction, any argument that reproduction is a major life
activity for them is clearly unreasonable.
Id. (citations omitted). This proposition is so ludicrous as to almost be self-refuting.
Homosexuality does not render men sterile. Gay men can reproduce in a number of
ways from donating sperm to lesbian couples to using surrogates. See generally
Heather Conrad & Kate Colwell, Creating Lesbian Families, in DYKE LIFE 149, 155-56
(Karla Jay ed., 1995) (describing phenomenon of lesbian couples who use sperm
from gay male friends and warning them to consider legal implications and
possibility of HIV transmission); Dan Savage, Status is . . . for Gay Men the Baby, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 1998, § 6 (Magazine), at 95 (arguing that babies acquired via
adoption or surrogacy have become a status symbol for gay men).
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Circuit, when it addressed Abbott v. Bragdon111 prior to review by the
Supreme Court, limited its holding writing that “HIV-positive status is
a physical impairment that substantially limits a fecund woman’s major
life activity of reproduction.”112 Although not expressly limiting its
holding to fecund women, the Supreme Court simply announced
that the “[r]espondent’s HIV infection is a physical impairment
which substantially limits a major life activity . . . .”113 The Supreme
Court thereby retained an individualized inquiry of analysis. The
Court did not require, however, that a plaintiff demonstrate an
interest in reproducing,114 only that a plaintiff was capable of
reproducing. But because some people are physically incapable of
reproducing, courts still may exclude reproduction as a major life
activity for broad segments of the population.115
Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Sutton v. United Air Lines,
Inc.,116 held that medical conditions should be considered in their
mitigated or medicated states.117 Although ADA regulations state that
conditions should be considered in their unmitigated states,118 the
Supreme Court found these regulations to be contrary to the express
language of the statute and refused to give the regulations any
111. 107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir. 1997), aff’d, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
112. Bragdon, 107 F.3d at 942 (emphasis added).
113. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2207. The Supreme Court, when framing the issue
wrote: “The final element of the disability definition in subsection (A) is whether
respondent’s physical impairment was a substantial limit on the major life activity she
asserts.” Id. at 2205.
114. See id. at 2206 (holding that the definition of disability does not turn on
personal choice but on the presence or absence of a limitation on a major life
activity).
115. See Schneider, supra note 104 (arguing that groups for whom it is impossible
to reproduce and groups who have no interest in reproduction should not be
allowed to claim reproduction as a major life activity).
116. 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
117. See id. at 2143 (holding that the determination of whether a person has a
disability must be made with reference to measures that mitigate the individual’s
impairment).
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the split in the circuits. Compare
Doane v. City of Omaha, 115 F.3d 624, 627-28 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that
medically controllable conditions should be considered in their unmitigated state),
with Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 866 n.10 (1st Cir. 1998)
(suggesting that whether a condition is considered in its mitigated or unmitigated
state depends on severity of condition), and Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d
893, 906 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that conditions must always be considered in
their mitigated state). The Third, Ninth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits had
reached a similar conclusion while the Eighth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits had shown a
willingness to reach a similar conclusion to that of the Tenth Circuit.
118. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app., at 350 (1999) (stating that conditions,
impairments and disorders should be considered in their unmitigated states). The
Department of Justice and the EEOC give examples of an epileptic and diabetic who
should be considered disabled regardless of whether the condition is controllable
through medication. See id.
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deference.119 The ramifications of this decision could affect plaintiffs
infected with HIV who take protease inhibitors,120 respond well to
them, and achieve an undetectable viral load.121 These individuals, by
all obvious standards, have regained their health entirely, and the
undetectability of HIV in their blood stream seems to indicate that
HIV infection is, for certain individuals, a “medically controllable
condition.”122 Although this conclusion is medically dubious,123 if a
judicial community can muster a significant plurality in Runnebaum to
hold that asymptomatic HIV infection is not an impairment,124 then it
is not implausible that a court will hold in the future that HIV
infection is a medically controllable condition that must be
considered in its mitigated state.
119. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147 (1999) (holding that regulations requiring
courts to consider conditions in their unmitigated state are expressly contrary to the
plain language of the statute, and that courts must disregard these regulations).
This decision seems even more capricious when viewed in light of House and
Senate Reports that specifically indicate mitigating measures such as medications and
devices are not to be considered when making a disability assessment. See H.R. REP.
NO. 101-485(III), at 28 (1990) (“The impairment should be assessed without
considering whether mitigating measures . . . would result in less-than-substantial
limitation.”); S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 23 (1989) (“[W]hether a person has a disability
should be assessed without regard to the availability of mitigating measures . . . .”).
120. Protease inhibitors are a class of antiviral drugs that interfere with HIV’s
ability to assemble new copies of itself. See Maenza & Flexner, supra note 74
(discussing how protease inhibitors work, their cost, proper dosing, combination
therapies, and common side effects). The most common of these is Crixivan
(indinavir) but others include Fortovase or Invirase (saquinavir), Norvir (ritonovir),
and Viracept (nelfinavir). See id. The triple drug “cocktail” therapy usually combines
two reverse transcriptase inhibitors, AZT class drugs, and one protease inhibitor. See
id.
121. See id. at 2 (delineating the current goal of antiretroviral therapy to be to
decrease the number of copies of HIV in patient’s blood stream, or viral load, to
undetectable levels within four to six months).
122. See Thamer E. Temple, Employers Prepare: Hope for AIDS Victims Means Conflict
in Your Workplace, 41 LAB. L.J. 694, 695 (1990) (noting that AIDS has transformed
from a deadly epidemic into a chronic, manageable disease); Elizabeth Kastor, The
New ‘Miracle’ AIDS Drugs: A Dose of Hope and Hard Reality; Researchers Caution That
Treatment Has Mixed Results, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 1996, at A1 (reporting that
optimism about success of triple drug therapies has led some to speculate that HIV
infection will become a “manageable” disease despite the fact that many people do
not respond to new drug treatments).
The high cost of the drugs, as much as $12,000 per year, and the difficulty in
maintaining the strict requirements of when to take the drugs make it difficult for
many to observe their treatment regimens. See David Brown, Poverty Entangles Promise
of Powerful Treatment, WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 1997, at A1 (describing the barriers to
treatment faced by those people who live in poverty).
123. See Grace Brooke Huffman, Review of protease inhibitors for use in HIV-1 infection
(Tips from Other Journals), AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN June 1, 1997, at 2825, available in 1997
WL 10150889 (commenting that long term effects of protease inhibitors are
unknown); Laurie Garrett, The Virus at the End of the World, VANITY FAIR, Mar. 1999, at
103-07 (documenting the temporary success of multiple drug therapies).
124. See Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., 123 F.3d 156, 169 (4th Cir. 1997)
(holding that asymptomatic HIV infection is not an impairment).
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Each of these groups—children, infertile people, gay men and
lesbians, and people responding well to protease inhibitors—stands
to suffer, not gain, from the Supreme Court’s holding in Bragdon.
Each of these groups will be forced to engage in costly, timeconsuming, and uncertain litigation to determine whether the
activities they substitute in place of reproduction do in fact constitute
major life activities.125
III. AIDS-PHOBIA AND THE “REGARDED AS” PRONG
Although the actual disability prong proved a difficult fit for
L.W.,126 proving an actual disability is only one option in meeting the
class requirements for ADA protections.127 The “regarded as” prong
of the ADA is a powerful alternative to the actual disability prong
because it addresses society’s and the covered entity’s fears about
disease and illness.128 AIDS and HIV infection fit nicely within the
framework of the “regarded as” prong because of the intensely
negative social responses they receive.129
The most tragic aspect of L.W.’s situation, and that of others
described above, is that he actually is ill130 with a fatal disease.131 A
strategy in ADA litigation to avoid legal liability, however, is to prove
that the plaintiff does not meet the requirements of the protected
class.132 L.W.’s situation is not uncommon, as amici in Bragdon
argued.133 According to the amici, courts have twisted the language of
125. See United States v. Happy Time Day Care Ctr., 6 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1081
(W.D. Wis. 1998) (noting that many diseases, such as the AIDS virus, cause related
medical problems that, when viewed in isolation, may not be classified as a disability
under the ADA, but would cause substantial limitations on major life activities if
considered over an extended period of time).
126. See id. at 1080-82 (concluding that the plaintiff might be limited in the major
life activity of caring for himself after rejecting several other possibilities of major life
activity classifications).
127. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C) (1994) (defining disability for purposes of
the ADA as having an actual physical or mental disability substantially limiting a
major life activity, having a record of disability, or being regarded as being disabled).
128. See infra notes 136-43 and accompanying text (discussing the “regarded as”
prong in literature, legislative language, and case law).
129. See infra notes 147-60 and accompanying text (elaborating on the stigma
associated with HIV infection and its consequences).
130. See Happy Time Day Care, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 1075-77 (describing the plaintiff’s
poor health status).
131. See id. at 1076-77 (noting that the plaintiff had only a 50% chance of reaching
his ninth or tenth birthday, and that he surely would die before reaching puberty).
132. See Lanctot, supra note 15, at 332 (demonstrating that many judges engage in
an overly probing analysis to find that plaintiffs, with conditions commonly thought
to be disabling, are not disabled).
133. See Brief for AIDS Action Council, Supporting Respondents, Bragdon v.
Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (No. 97-156), available in 1998 WL 47252, at *22 n.65
(arguing that courts distorted the definition of disability to exclude many conditions

492

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:471

the ADA,134 which is identical to that of the Rehabilitation Act, to
achieve different results.135
The solution to discourage courts from distorting the definition of
actual disability to avoid finding plaintiffs disabled under the ADA136
is to sidestep the “actual” disability test in favor of the “regarded as”
disabled test.137 The explicit language of the ADA addresses people
who are regarded as disabled, whether or not they have a disabling
condition, and tailors a remedy for them.138 In using the “regarded
as” language, Congress, as with the rest of the ADA’s definition of
disability, relied on the definition used in the Rehabilitation Act.139 In
construing the Rehabilitation Act’s definition of “regarded as”
disabled, the Supreme Court noted in School Board of Nassau County v.
Arline140 that “Congress acknowledged that society’s accumulated
myths and fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as
are the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment.”141
The Supreme Court acknowledged in Arline that Congress had two

commonly thought of as disabling).
134. See id.
135. Compare Reynolds v. Brock, 815 F.2d 571, 574 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that a
person with epilepsy is disabled for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act), and
Bentivegna v. United States Dep’t of Labor, 694 F.2d 619, 621 (9th Cir. 1982)
(noting that diabetic plaintiff is disabled for purposes of Rehabilitation Act), and
Pushkin v. University of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1376 (10th Cir. 1981) (noting that a
person with multiple sclerosis is disabled for purposes of Rehabilitation Act), and
Fynes v. Weinberger, 677 F. Supp. 315, 321 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (concluding that
plaintiffs with asbestos-related disease are disabled for purposes of Rehabilitation
Act), with Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 191 (5th Cir. 1996) (ruling
that a woman with breast cancer is not disabled for purposes of ADA), and Kocsis v.
Multi-Care Management, Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 884 (6th Cir. 1996) (concluding that
plaintiff with multiple sclerosis is not disabled for the purposes of ADA), and Matczak
v. Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., 950 F. Supp. 693, 696 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (holding
that the plaintiff with epilepsy is not disabled for purposes of ADA), rev’d, 136 F.3d
933 (3d Cir. 1997) (reversing district court’s holding that the epileptic claimant was
not disabled), and Schluter v. Industrial Coils, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 1437, 1446 (W.D.
Wis. 1996) (determining person with insulin-dependent diabetes is not disabled for
purposes of ADA).
136. See Jenkins, supra note 22, at 648 (warning that the ADA’s elastic language
can be stretched to include or exclude asymptomatic HIV infection).
137. See Schneider, supra note 104, at 226 (arguing that asymptomatic HIV
infection does not meet the criteria for an actual disability for the purposes of the
ADA and should be considered under the “regarded as” test).
138. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (1994) (defining “disability” as being perceived
as having an impairing condition).
139. See id. § 12201(a) (explaining that “[n]othing in this chapter shall be
construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under title V of the
Rehabilitation Act . . . or the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such
title”) (citation omitted).
140. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
141. Arline, 480 U.S. at 284. The Supreme Court held that a school teacher was
“regarded as” disabled due to her “contagious” nature and because she had been
hospitalized for repeated relapses of tuberculosis. See id. at 281.
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motives in passing the Rehabilitation Act: to remove actual barriers
to employment and access to services, and to address invidious
discrimination based on “myths and fears” about disabilities and
disease.142 The Supreme Court recognized that society has negative
reactions to disease143 and acknowledged that Congress intended to
address these reactions. Admittedly, society’s response to HIV and
AIDS is no longer what it once was.144 Fear and death are no longer
monolithic in the literature on AIDS. Conservative columnist
Andrew Sullivan, himself infected with HIV, argues that with the
advent of protease inhibitors AIDS is no longer a death sentence.145
Sullivan and other HIV-infected people have contemplated the
realities of their death and regained their health.146
Still, others argue that the days of AIDS as a “special” disease are
limited.147 AIDS, like few other diseases in history, has engendered
intense negative social responses. Societies generally fear disease
because it forces people to confront disability, dependence, and
death.148 Because HIV is transmitted only through the exchange of
142. See id. at 284.
143. See id. at 282. See generally SUSAN SONTAG, ILLNESS AS METAPHOR (1979)
(describing the social construction of disease and arguing for a purely scientific view
of disease free of negative emotions).
144. See Linda C. Fentiman, AIDS as a Chronic Illness: A Cautionary Tale for the End
of the Twentieth Century, 61 ALB. L. REV. 989, 989 (1998) (arguing that the social
construction of HIV is changing in light of changing demographics of HIV
infection); Wendy E. Parmet & Daniel J. Jackson, No Longer Disabled: The Legal Impact
of the New Social Construction of HIV, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 7-9 (1997) (arguing that the
changing social construction of HIV disease has removed the stigma of HIV infection
and has removed its disabling consequences).
145. See Andrew Sullivan, When Plagues End, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1996, § 6
(Magazine), at 52 (contemplating the end of a plague for those with the resources to
continue expensive regimens of antiviral medication).
146. See id. at 58 (describing the response of some people to antiviral medication
and the fact that their deaths have been delayed). Sullivan observed the impact of
new drug therapies:
I had grown used to the shock of seeing someone I knew suddenly age 20 or
30 years in a few months; now I had to adjust to the reverse. People I had
seen hobbling along, their cheekbones poking out of their skin, their eyes
deadened and looking down, were suddenly restored into some strange
spectacle of health, gazing around as amazed as I was to see them alive.
Id. at 59. From these transformations, Sullivan makes the following observations.
A difference between the end of AIDS and the end of many other plagues:
for the first time in history, a large proportion of the survivors will not simply
be those who escaped infection, or were immune to the virus, but those who
contracted the illness, contemplated their own deaths and still survived.
Id. at 58.
147. See Fentiman, supra note 144, at 989 (predicting that AIDS will no longer be a
special disease); Parmet & Jackson, supra note 144, at 8-9 (arguing that the changing
social construction of HIV disease will affect the legal status of HIV disease as a
disability).
148. See Allan M. Brandt, AIDS and Metaphor: Toward the Social Meaning of Epidemic
Disease, 55 SOC. RES. 413, 414-15 (1988) (separating the biological phenomenon of
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bodily fluids, and most commonly during sexual activity or
intravenous drug use,149 society has been even more reluctant to
discuss AIDS and AIDS education.150 People with AIDS continue to
be divided between “innocent” victims, such as children and those
who are infected through blood transfusions and infected blood
products, and, by implication, the non-innocent—gay men, sexually
active people, drug users, and prostitutes.151 Statements such as Pat
Buchanan’s in 1983 that “[t]he poor homosexuals—they have
declared war on Nature, and now Nature is exacting an awful
retribution,”152 live on in popular memory. Mythically, AIDS is still a
disease of poverty, perversion, and addiction; AIDS is not a disease
that affects suburban families.153
Coupled with the ignorance of who contracts HIV is ignorance of
how HIV is contracted. Nearly twenty years have passed since AIDS
was first identified.154 At that time, the modes of transmission were
unknown.155 Today more information about the disease and modes
of transmission is available, but this information is not reaching
significant sectors of the population.156 In fact, misinformation about
the disease from the emotions and reactions that the disease incites).
149. The CDC identifies that men who have sex with men, people who use
injecting drugs, recipients of blood, tissue, or coagulants, infants of HIV-infected
mothers, and people who have sexual contact with people in other high risk
categories are those at highest risk of exposure to HIV. See HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE
REPORT, supra note 102, at 42 (listing the major forms of HIV transmission).
150. See Brandt, supra note 148, at 427 (arguing that programs such as AIDS
education are seen as endorsing teenage premarital sex and homosexuality, while
needle exchange programs are seen as endorsing drug use).
151. See Kurth, supra note 102, at 4 (describing images in popular culture of the
typical person infected with HIV).
152. See Brandt, supra note 148, at 429 (quoting N.Y. POST, May 24, 1983).
153. The CDC reports that 48% of the total reported adult and adolescent AIDS
cases were found among men who have sex with men, and 26% of reported cases fell
into the category of injecting drug users. See HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REPORT, supra
note 102, at 14. From the 33 states that report HIV cases, 33% of people who have
been infected with HIV are men who have sex with men and 17% are injecting drug
users. See id. at 15.
AIDS affects members of racial minorities in far greater proportions. An estimated
58.6% of the 270,841 people living with AIDS in the United States in 1997 were black
or Hispanic. See id. at 34.
AIDS is primarily an urban phenomenon. In the central counties of metropolitan
areas with 500,000 or more people, the AIDS rate from December 1997 to December
1998 was 24.7 cases per 100,000. See id. at 11. In the outlying counties of
metropolitan areas of 500,000 or more the rate was 6.5 per 100,000. See id. The rate
for metropolitan areas of 50,000 to 500,000 was 10.3 per 100,000. See id. The rate for
non-metropolitan areas was 6.3 per 100,000. See id.
154. See RANDY SHILTS, AND THE BAND PLAYED ON 61-68 (1987) (describing how the
first cases of the disease were reported).
155. See id. at 68 (relating the uncertainty of public health experts about the
modes of transmission of the newly identified disease).
156. See Lynda Richardson, Wave of Laws Aimed at People With H.I.V., N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 25, 1998, at A1 (noting the need for the general public to receive accurate
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HIV is increasing according to a national phone survey.157 The results
of the survey indicated that in 1991, forty-eight percent of the country
erroneously believed that HIV could be contracted by sharing a
drinking cup with an infected person.158 By 1998, fifty-five percent of
those surveyed erroneously believed that the virus could be
contracted this way.159 Although three-quarters of those surveyed
believe that people with HIV are treated unfairly,160 twenty-nine
percent of people surveyed also believe that large groups of people
who are HIV-infected deserved to be infected.161 This lack of empathy
has dangerous consequences, among them the concern held by onequarter of those surveyed that most infected individuals do not care if
they infect others.162
Many courts have recognized the gravity and intensity of hostilities
toward people with AIDS.163 Several courts have recognized a
condition sometimes known as “AIDS-phobia,” the rational or
irrational fear that a person has contracted HIV from a potential
exposure to the virus, and have even awarded monetary damages in
tort actions.164 Enough empirical and anecdotal evidence exists to
information about the transmission of HIV).
157. See id. at A25 (highlighting data from a national phone survey conducted by
researchers at the University of California at Davis about the American public’s views
and knowledge of AIDS).
158. See id.
159. See id. The same study also showed that today 41% erroneously believe that
HIV can be contracted through public toilets, compared with 34% in 1991.
160. See id.
161. See id. This striking lack of empathy is also reflected in the commonly held
assertions that half of those surveyed believe that HIV infection is the fault of the
infected person. See id.
162. See Richardson, supra note 156, at A1 (suggesting that the recent wave of
criminal transmission statutes can be attributed to the fear that HIV-infected
individuals are a dangerous threat to the rest of the population). As a result of
similar fears, 29 states now have criminal transmission statutes making it a crime to
knowingly transmit HIV. See id. at A1.
163. See Chalk v. United States Dist. Ct., 840 F.2d 701, 703 (9th Cir. 1988) (ruling
on a case involving a teacher with AIDS who was removed from teaching duties); Doe
v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 378 (D.N.J. 1990) (recounting facts that
a police officer told people at the scene of an accident to wash with disinfectant
because the husband of a woman involved in the accident had AIDS); Poff v. Caro,
549 A.2d 900, 902 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987) (reciting facts that landlord
refused to rent an apartment to three gay men for fear of AIDS).
164. See Faya v. Alamaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 339 (Md. 1993) (holding that plaintiffs
could proceed on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against the
estate of an HIV-infected surgeon who performed surgery on them and did not
inform plaintiffs of his condition). Cf. Carroll v. Sisters of Saint Francis Health
Servs., Inc., 868 S.W.2d 585, 594 (Tenn. 1993) (recognizing plaintiff’s fear of
exposure to HIV, yet holding that plaintiff could not maintain a claim for negligent
infliction of emotional distress in the absence of real exposure). See generally
Mandana Shahvari, Comment, AfrAIDS: Fear of AIDS as a Cause of Action, 67 TEMP. L.
REV. 769 (1994) (describing causes of action in several courts based on the fear of
exposure to and possible contraction of AIDS).
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allow judges to entertain the rebuttable presumption that an
otherwise qualified individual was denied employment or services on
the basis of the covered entity’s negative attitudes towards HIV
infection and AIDS.165
IV. THE “REGARDED AS” PRONG AS A SOLUTION FOR REMEDYING
DISCRIMINATION
The legislative history of the ADA,166 Department of Justice
opinions regarding § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,167 § 504 case law,168
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) regulations
construing the ADA,169 expert opinion,170 and early ADA case law171
165. See supra notes 156-62 and accompanying text (discussing results of a national
phone survey which demonstrates that large portions of the American public are
ignorant of HIV’s modes of transmission).
166. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text (providing legislative history of
ADA with respect to HIV).
167. See supra note 47 (discussing the Department of Justice interpretation of ADA
coverage to include HIV infection).
168. See Chalk, 840 F.2d at 701 (recognizing high probability of success on the
merits, based on claim that HIV constitutes a handicap under the Rehabilitation
Act); Doe v. Centinela Hosp., 57 U.S.L.W. 2034 (C.D. Cal., June 30, 1988)
(perceiving HIV-infected plaintiff as having a disability); Local 1812 v. Department of
State, 662 F. Supp. 50, 54 (D.D.C. 1987) (stating that plaintiff infected with HIV is
disabled and also could be perceived as disabled); Ray v. School Dist. of DeSoto
County, 666 F. Supp. 1524, 1538 (M.D. Fla. 1987) (holding that person with HIV
infection is disabled); Thomas v. Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376, 381
(C.D. Cal. 1986) (same). See generally Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings
on S. 933 Before the Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Human Resources, 101st Cong. 612-22 (1989) (prepared statement of Chai R.
Feldblum, Legislative Counsel, ACLU AIDS Project) (examining § 504 case law and
finding that asymptomatic HIV infection has been found to be a disability for the
purposes of the Rehabilitation Act).
169. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.104(1)(ii) (1999); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(1)(iii) (1999) (both
stating that the phrase “physical or mental impairment” includes symptomatic or
asymptomatic HIV disease); 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, at 478 (1999) (commenting that
the regulations were modified to state explicitly that symptomatic and asymptomatic
HIV infection are covered by the ADA in response to ADA committee reports, case
law, and official legal opinions analyzing § 504); 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B, at 619
(1999) (same); 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, at 478 (1999) (stating that asymptomatic HIV
infection severely limits an individual’s major life activity either because of the
infection’s “actual effect on the individual” or because it causes the individual to be
treated by others as disabled); 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B, at 619 (same); 29 C.F.R. pt.
1630, app., at 349 (1999) (noting that HIV infection is inherently and substantially
limiting and therefore covered by ADA).
The Department of Justice and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”), like Congress, used HIV infection in many of their examples of
prohibited activities under the ADA. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B, at 633 (1999)
(explaining that if a day care center declines to admit a child because the child’s
sibling is HIV-infected, then the day care center has violated the association prong of
the ADA); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app., at 360 (1999) (using as an illustration of
prohibited activity under the association prong, the example of an employer who
discharges an employee who does volunteer work for people with AIDS because the
employer fears that the employee may contract HIV); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app., at 365
(stating that an employer cannot require employees to be tested for HIV or cancer
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uniformly support a finding that asymptomatic HIV should be a
disability for the purposes of the ADA. In light of recent decisions
such as Runnebaum,172 and the loopholes in Bragdon,173 plaintiffs such
as L.W. must litigate major life activities other than reproduction
under the “actual disability” prong174 or pursue the “regarded as”
prong of the disability test.175 Despite poor interpretations from the
courts, the “regarded as” prong is the most logical choice for
plaintiffs such as L.W. in light of the liberal way the EEOC and
Department of Justice regulations interpret it.
The Department of Justice and the EEOC have defined “regarded
as having such an impairment” to mean a person who:
(1) Has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially
limit major life activities but is treated by a covered entity as
constituting
such
a
limitation;
[“exaggerated-limitations
definition”]
(2) Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward
such impairment; [“negative-attitudes definition”] or
(3) Has none of the impairments defined in paragraphs(h)(1) or
(2) of this section but is treated by a covered entity as having a
176
substantially limiting impairment.

The Court in Sutton addressed, in part, the definition of “regarded
as” disabled in the ADA. Writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor
specifically mentions the exaggerated-limitations definition and the
third definition given by the EEOC.177 Justice O’Connor, however,
unless such testing is job-related and necessary for business); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app.,
at 367 (explaining that disparate treatment occurs when employers have a policy of
not hiring people with AIDS despite their qualifications).
170. See Milton Bordwin, AIDS: Not Just a Medical Problem, OR. ST. B. BULL. at 15,
16 Feb.-Mar. 1996, available in WESTLAW 56-MAR ORSBB 15 (opining that
employers generally cannot discriminate against employees with HIV or AIDS or
mere perception of AIDS); Chai R. Feldblum, Americans with Disabilities Act: Selected
Employment Requirements, Q217 ALI-ABA VIDEO L. REV. 29, 44 (1992), available in
WESTLAW Q217 ALI-ABA 29 (stating in unequivocal terms that HIV infection,
whether symptomatic or asymptomatic, is covered by the ADA); Robert B. Fitzpatrick
& E. Anne Benaroya, Americans with Disabilities Act and AIDS, 8 LAB. LAW. 249, 269
(1992) (concluding that because the ADA is ambiguous, employers should not base
hiring decisions on an employee’s HIV status).
171. See supra note 75 (citing prior case law interpreting ADA).
172. 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997).
173. 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
174. See supra note 64 (discussing how HIV substantially limits major life activities).
175. See Schneider, supra note 104, at 226 (arguing that certain holdings stating
that people with asymptomatic HIV infection are actually disabled for the purposes
of the ADA warps the “actually disabled” test, and that these plaintiffs should
alternatively argue that they are regarded as disabled).
176. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(1)-(3) (1999).
177. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2149-50 (1999).
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does not consider whether the EEOC’s negative-attitudes definition is
an appropriate reading of the statute.178
Of these three definitions, the exaggerated-limitations and
negative-attitudes definitions apply to L.W., who has an impairment
for the purposes of the ADA.179 As Judge Crabb has held, however,
L.W. may or may not be substantially impaired as to a major life
activity and therefore, may not be actually disabled.180 Under the
exaggerated-limitations definition, the plaintiff must demonstrate
that a covered entity regarded the plaintiff as being substantially
impaired as to a major life activity. Many courts have forced plaintiffs
to demonstrate that the covered entity regarded them as being
impaired as to a major life activity.181 These plaintiffs frequently failed
because no covered entity would admit that they regarded the
plaintiff as being disabled, and rarely are the facts sufficiently strong
that they speak for themselves in this regard.182
Justice O’Connor writes,
There are two apparent ways in which individuals may fall within this
statutory definition: (1) a covered entity mistakenly believes that a person
has a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities, or (2) a covered entity mistakenly believes that an actual,
nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities.
Id.
178. See id.
179. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2196 (1998) (holding that
asymptomatic HIV infection is a physical impairment for the purposes of the ADA).
180. See United States v. Happy Time Day Care Ctr., 6 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1075
(W.D. Wis. 1998) (holding that although a reasonable jury might find that the
plaintiff was substantially limited in his ability to care for himself it cannot be said as
a matter of law that L.W. is so impaired).
181. See Reeves v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 140 F.3d 144, 153 (2d Cir.
1998) (formulating the “regarded as” test as requiring the individual to show that the
employer regarded the employee as having an impairment that substantially limited
major life activity); Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., 123 F.3d 156, 172-74 (4th
Cir. 1997) (formulating the “regarded as” test as protecting “individuals who are
regarded or perceived . . . as having an impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities . . .”); Thompson v. Holy Family Hosp., 121 F.3d 537, 541
(9th Cir. 1997) (rejecting plaintiff’s assertion that defendant employer regarded her
as being substantially limited in her ability to lift or work because the employer must
perceive the impairment as “substantially limiting and significant”) (citing Gordon v.
E.L. Hamm & Assocs., Inc., 100 F.3d 907, 913 (11th Cir. 1996)); Zuppardo v. Suffolk
County Vanderbilt Museum, 19 F. Supp. 2d 52, 57 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (requiring the
employee to demonstrate that the employer regarded the employee as having an
impairment that substantially limited a major life activity); EEOC v. General Elec.
Co., 17 F. Supp. 2d 824, 828-29 (N.D. Ind. 1998) (requiring evidence that employer
perceived employee to be substantially limited as to major life activity or disabled to
meet requirements of “regarded as” test); Cortes v. McDonald’s Corp., 955 F. Supp.
541, 546 (E.D.N.C. 1996) (same).
182. See Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 172-74 (finding no evidence that the relevant
decision-maker regarded the plaintiff as having an impairment that substantially
limited his major life activity); Thompson, 121 F.3d at 541 (finding that despite
defendant’s awareness of plaintiff’s carpal tunnel syndrome, there was no evidence
that defendant regarded plaintiff as being disabled); Zuppardo, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 57
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Judge Crabb had harsh words for this approach:
Requiring plaintiff to show that defendants believed L.W.’s HIV
status substantially limited one of his major life activities . . . would
undermine the Supreme Court’s declaration that no meaningful
distinction should be drawn between the myths, fears and
ignorance surrounding contagious diseases and the actual effects
such stigmatizing conditions have on individuals who suffer from
them.
Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether the allegedly
prejudicial reactions of defendants substantially limited one of
L.W.’s major life activities. Just as the negative reaction of an
employer to a contagious disease can substantially limit an
individual’s ability to work, the ability of L.W. to learn has been
substantially limited because defendants’ misapprehensions and
183
fears have prevented him from enrolling in day care.

Judge Crabb seems to realize that the day care center operators’
misperceptions of L.W.’s physical capabilities is not useful, much less
relevant, to the inquiry of whether L.W. was the victim of disabilitybased discrimination.184 The emphasis in this analysis should be
whether the covered entity committed an act of discrimination
against the plaintiff.185 This analysis is supported not only by the
(finding that defendant was aware of plaintiff’s mental illness, but finding no
evidence that defendant regarded plaintiff as disabled); General Electric, 17 F. Supp.
2d at 831 (finding no evidence that plaintiff’s supervisors regarded him as impaired
as to a major life activity); Cortes, 955 F. Supp. at 546 (finding no evidence that
defendants thought that plaintiff’s HIV infection was an impairment or that
plaintiff’s death was imminent).
183. Happy Time Day Care, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 1084 (citation omitted).
184. See id. at 1084 (writing that the relevant inquiry is whether the defendants’
“prejudicial actions” limited the plaintiff’s major life activities); see also Breitenfeldt v.
Long Prairie Packing Co., 48 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1179 (D. Minn. 1999) (referring to
congressional intent when determining that the alleged harassment plaintiff received
after revealing his impaired vision qualified him as being “regarded as” disabled even
though he was not actually disabled).
185. See Happy Time Day Care, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 1084 (determining that the analysis
should focus on the defendant’s prejudice against plaintiff).
Judge Posner commented on the seeming incongruity of the “regarded as” prong
with the rest of the statute, which is devoted to providing access and aid to actually
disabled people, not those perceived as disabled. In Vande Zande v. Wisconsin
Department of Administration, 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995), Posner wrote:
[A]lthough at first glance peculiar, [the “regarded as” prong of the ADA]
actually makes a better fit with the elaborate preamble to the Act, in which
people who have physical or mental impairments are compared to victims of
racial and other invidious discrimination. Many such impairments are not in
fact disabling but are believed to be so, and the people having them may be
denied employment or otherwise shunned as a consequence. Such people,
objectively capable of performing as well as the unimpaired, are analogous to
capable workers discriminated against because of their skin color or some
other vocationally irrelevant characteristic.
Id. at 541; see also Penny v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 128 F.3d 408, 414 (6th Cir. 1997)
(observing that the ADA protects against discrimination of individuals with
disabilities).
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negative-attitudes definition of “regarded as” disabled given by the
EEOC,186 but also by other guidance from the EEOC describing how
to examine ADA claims,187 as well as the legislative history of the
ADA.188
EEOC and DOJ regulations are very specific in describing how
courts should make inferences of discrimination.189 Specifically, if
someone is denied public accommodation or access to a public
benefit, and the covered entity cannot legitimately justify the denial,
then it can be inferred that the individual would qualify under the
“regarded as” test.190 This “regarded as” test recognizes that the
problem of discrimination lies with the covered entity’s assumptions
and not with whether the covered entity perceived the person as
substantially impaired as to a major life activity.191
The Supreme Court gave this approach credence in Arline. In
Arline, the Court concluded that impairments might not diminish a
person’s physical or mental capabilities, but “could nevertheless
substantially limit that person’s ability to work as a result of the
negative reactions of others to the impairment.”192 Again, the Court’s
emphasis is not on whether the covered entity perceived the
individual as having specific impairments, but whether the covered
entity mistreated the individual based upon negative reactions to the
individual’s disability.193
186. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(1)-(3) (1999) (defining “regarded as” disabled).
187. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B, at 621 (1999) (permitting an inference of
discrimination in the absence of legitimate reasons for refusing accommodation, and
allowing such individuals to qualify for coverage under the “regarded as” test). But
see Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 172-74 (finding no evidence that the relevant decisionmaker regarded plaintiff as having an impairment that substantially limited major life
activity and making no inference of discrimination); Cortes, 955 F. Supp. at 546
(E.D.N.C. 1996) (same).
188. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 31 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303, 313 (quoting Americans with Disabilities Act of 1988: Hearings on S. 2345 Before the
Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources and
Before the Subcomm. on Select Educ. of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 100th Cong.
40 (1989) (statement of Adm. James Watkins, Chairperson, President’s Commission
on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic) (commenting on the disabling
effects of HIV because of the negative reactions HIV-infected people receive)).
189. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, at 480 (1999) (describing the types of inferences the
“regarded as” prong allows courts to make); 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B, at 621 (same).
190. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, at 480; 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B, at 621 (both
discussing permissible inferences based on public entity’s illegitimate refusal to
admit person with actual or perceived physical or mental condition).
191. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, at 480; 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B, at 621 (both
focusing “regarded as” analysis on public entity).
192. School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 283 (1987).
193. See id. (placing emphasis on the role that fears surrounding disability play in
the “regarded as” test of the Rehabilitation Act).
The “regarded as” prongs of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA are so expansive
that they can be used whether the plaintiff has a disability or not. In Miller v. Spicer,
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Although Justice O’Connor did not mention this approach in
Sutton,194 she did cite to the specific language in Arline that gave rise to
the ADA’s “regarded as” prong.195 Arline’s construction of the phrase
“regarded as” is still authoritative; Justice O’Connor did not question
Arline in her reference to the ADA’s “regarded as” test.196
Detractors might argue that this is not an objective standard;
however, AIDS-phobia and hysteria exist objectively. If the ADA’s
covered entities fear the possible consequences of this approach, all
they have to do is what the ADA requires: not consider diseases,
conditions, and physical impairments when making employment
decisions.197 Furthermore, all of the ADA defenses are still available
to such covered entities. The only restriction placed on defendants
under this approach is the inability to claim that someone they
terminated on the basis of their HIV status is not disabled and
therefore, not a member of the protected class.
This “regarded as” prong approach focuses the legal analysis not
on who is a member of the class, which under the ADA is supposed to
be an expansive class and not a limited one,198 but on the alleged act
of discrimination itself.

822 F. Supp. 158 (D. Del. 1993), an emergency room surgeon perceived the plaintiff,
who suffered from a severed tendon, as gay. See id. at 160. The surgeon refused to
operate on the plaintiff unless the plaintiff could inform the surgeon of his HIV
status. See id. at 161. The plaintiff did not know his HIV status and as a result, the
surgeon refused to operate. The plaintiff sued the surgeon and the hospital under
the Rehabilitation Act, and prevailed against the hospital but not against the surgeon
because of a technicality in the Rehabilitation Act. See id. at 162-66. Thus, this case
illustrates that a plaintiff can be regarded as disabled despite the fact that he or she
has no impairment.
194. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2149-50 (1999) (failing to
mention the “negative-attitudes” definition).
195. See id. at 2150 (citing Arline’s reasoning that myth and fear are as
handicapping as actual physical impairments).
196. See id. at 2149-50. Given Justice O’Connor’s readiness to declare that the
EEOC’s interpretation requiring conditions to be considered in their unmitigated
states is contrary to the plain language of the statute, she would have done the same
to the Arline framework had she intended it to be rejected entirely. See id. at 2146-47
(rejecting the EEOC’s interpretations of the statute as contrary to the express
language of the ADA).
197. See Mello, supra note 48, at 118 (arguing that the best way for employers to
avoid liability under the ADA is to not discriminate against employees infected with
HIV).
198. But see Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147 (observing that Congress indicated that 43
million Americans have disabilities and limiting the definition of disability contained
within the ADA to cover only a class of individuals of approximately that size).
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CONCLUSION
The empirical data about AIDS-phobia and misinformation about
AIDS199 permit courts today to draw inferences about discriminatory
intent by covered entities. As AIDS education increases and as
society’s responses to AIDS and HIV infection change, so will the
reaction infected people receive from co-workers, service providers,
and the courts.200 Some day, L.W. and a million other Americans will
not be disabled by HIV as a result of the negative attitudes of others.
That day is not yet here. Until then, the courts must find a solution
that remedies the loophole in Bragdon, which fails to protect people
who are too young, too old, suffer from other reproductive
impairments, or could be construed as intrinsically having no interest
in reproducing.201 The solution is the “regarded as” prong of the
definition of disability under the ADA.
By emphasizing the covered entity’s actions,202 coupled with a
powerful ability for courts to infer discriminatory intent,203 the ADA
turns back into what it was intended to be: a broad remedial
statute.204 The ADA is a rare piece of legislation in today’s political
climate because it was intended to transform society.205 Just as the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 was designed to eliminate discrimination on
the basis of race and sex, the ADA was designed to eliminate all
discrimination on the basis of any disability.206 HIV and AIDS existed
in 1990 when Congress debated the ADA. HIV and AIDS were not
written out of the ADA like homosexuality, transvestitism,
kleptomania, and pyromania.207 HIV disease must not be written out
199. See supra Part III (discussing AIDS-phobia and “regarded as” prong of ADA).
200. See Fentiman, supra note 144, at 989 (arguing that the changing social
construction of HIV will spell the demise of AIDS as a special disease).
201. See supra Part II (discussing Bragdon’s failure to protect certain plaintiffs).
202. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(2) (1999) (identifying the attitudes and actions of
others as being substantially limiting even when the physical or mental impairment
itself does not substantially limit a major life activity); see also Feldblum, supra note
170, at 38-39 (explaining that purpose of third prong of ADA’s definition of disability
is to scrutinize employer’s discriminatory actions).
203. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, at 480 (1999); 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B, at 621
(permitting inferences of discrimination).
204. See Penny v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 128 F.3d 408, 414 (6th Cir. 1997)
(observing that ADA is “broad remedial statute”).
205. See supra note 6 (discussing Congress’ intent to provide a national mandate
for eliminating disability discrimination).
206. See Steven S. Locke, The Incredible Shrinking Class: Redefining the Scope of
Disability Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 107, 141-42
(1997) (discussing how the “regarded as” prong of the ADA’s definition of disability
mirrors the goals of Title VII).
207. See 42 U.S.C. § 12211 (1994) (stating that under this chapter, the term
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by the courts via loopholes208 or by determinations that HIV infection
is not a disability.209

“disability” does not include homosexuality, bisexuality, transvestitism, pedophilia,
exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity disorders, other sexual behavior disorders,
compulsive gambling, kleptomania, pyromania, and psychoactive substance use
disorders stemming from current illegal drug use).
208. See supra Part II (discussing the loopholes created in Bragdon and Happy Time
Day Care).
209. See Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., 123 F.3d 156, 169 (4th Cir. 1997)
(holding that asymptomatic HIV infection is not a disability).

